Resurrection

"But it was the prosecuting side that demanded this reading,"

Nekhludoff said, with surprise.

"That does not matter. There might have been reasons for the

defence to demand this reading, too."

"Oh, but there could have been no reason whatever for that."

"It is a ground for appeal, though. To continue: 'Secondly,' he

went on reading, 'when Maslova's advocate, in his speech for the

defence, wishing to characterise Maslova's personality, referred

to the causes of her fall, he was interrupted by the president

calling him to order for the alleged deviation from the direct

subject. Yet, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the Senate,

the elucidation of the criminal's characteristics and his or her

moral standpoint in general has a significance of the first

importance in criminal cases, even if only as a guide in the

settling of the question of imputation.' That's point two," he

said, with a look at Nekhludoff.

"But he spoke so badly that no one could make anything of it,"

Nekhludoff said, still more astonished.

"The fellow's quite a fool, and of course could not be expected

to say anything sensible," Fanarin said, laughing; "but, all the

same, it will do as a reason for appeal. Thirdly: 'The president,

in his summing up, contrary to the direct decree of section 1,

statute 801, of the criminal code, omitted to inform the jury

what the judicial points are that constitute guilt; and did not

mention that having admitted the fact of Maslova having

administered the poison to Smelkoff, the jury had a right not to

impute the guilt of murder to her, since the proofs of wilful

intent to deprive Smelkoff of life were absent, and only to

pronounce her guilty of carelessness resulting in the death of

the merchant, which she did not desire.' This is the chief

point."

"Yes; but we ought to have known that ourselves. It was our

mistake."

"And now the fourth point," the advocate continued. "The form of

the answer given by the jury contained an evident contradiction.

Maslova is accused of wilfully poisoning Smelkoff, her one object

being that of cupidity, the only motive to commit murder she

could have had. The jury in their verdict acquit her of the

intent to rob, or participation in the stealing of valuables,

from which it follows that they intended also to acquit her of

the intent to murder, and only through a misunderstanding, which

arose from the incompleteness of the president's summing up,

omitted to express it in due form in their answer. Therefore an

answer of this kind by the jury absolutely demanded the

application of statutes 816 and 808 of the criminal code of

procedure, i.e., an explanation by the president to the jury of

the mistake made by them, and another debate on the question of

the prisoner's guilt."